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Abstract
In the present work we propose an original analytical model of coopetitive game. We
shall apply this analytical model of coopetition (based on normal form game theory) to the
Greek crisis, while conceiving this game theory model at a macro level. We construct two
realizations of such model, trying to represent possible realistic macro-economic scenarios
of the Germany-Greek strategic interaction. We shall suggest - after a deep and complete
study of the two samples - feasible transferable utility solutions in a properly coopetitive
perspective for the divergent interests which drive the economic policies in the euro area.
Keywords. Games and Economics, competition, cooperation, coopetition, normal form
games
1 Introduction
Greece, a country that represents just over 2% of gross domestic product of the Euro area, has
led to a deep and widespread crisis in Europe. The Greek economy is locked into a serious
and difficult crisis, due to its lack of competitiveness and is stil at risk of insolvency, because of
its public finance mismanagement. Although the EU Governments and the IMF have provided
substantial financial assistance to cover the refinancing needs of Greece in exchange of a serious
and though austerity program, and even, the banks have agreed an heavy haircut on the Greek
debts, the Greek economy is still on the brink of collapse. Germany, on the other hand, is the
most competitive economy of the Euro Area and has a large trade surplus with Greece and other
Euro partners; hence significant trade imbalances occur within the Euro Area.
The main purpose of our paper is to explore win-win solutions for Greece and Germany,
involving a German increasing demand of a pre-determined Greek exports. We do not analyze
the causes of the financial crisis in Greece and its relevant political and institutional effects on
the European Monetary Union. Rather we concentrate on stability and growth, which should
drive the economic policy of Greece and the other Euro countries.
Organization of the paper. The work is organized as follows:
• section 2 examines the Greek crisis, suggesting a possible way out to reduce the intra-
eurozone imbalances through coopetitive solutions within a growth path;
• section 3 presents the original model of coopetitive game introduced in literature by D.
Carf`ı;
• section 4 propose possible solutions concepts for the original model of coopetitive game;
• section 5, very briefly, provides the general ideas we follow, in this paper, for the applica-
tions of coopetitive games to the Eurozone context;
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• section 6 provides a first sample of coopetitive game applied to the Eurozone context,
showing possible coopetitive solutions; we propose the first sample in an intentionally
simplified fashion (without direct strategic interactions among players) to emphasize the
new role and procedures of coopetition;
• section 7 provides a second sample of coopetitive game applied to the Eurozone context,
showing possible coopetitive solutions; we propose a linear model, with a direct strategic
interactions among players;
• conclusions end up the paper.
Section 2 of this paper has been written by D. Schiliro` while sections from 3 to 7 are due
to D. Carf`ı, however, in strict joint cooperation. Abstract, introduction and conclusions were
written by both authors, together.
Acknowledgments. We wish to thank Albert E. Steenge, E. Perrone and three anonymous
referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.
2 The Greek Crisis and the coopetitive solution
The deep financial crisis of Greece, which was almost causing the default of its sovereign debt,
has revealed the weaknesses of Greek economy, particularly its lack of competitiveness, but also
the mismanagement of the public finance and the difficulties of the banking sector.
2.1 The crisis and the Greek economy
With the outbreak of the global crisis of 2008-2009, Greece relied on state spending to drive
growth, so the country has accumulated a huge public debt. This has created deep concerns
about its fiscal sustainability, and its financial exposition has prevented the Greek government to
find capitals in the financial markets. In addition, Greece has lost competitiveness since joining
the European Monetary Union and, because of that, Greek’s unit labor cost rose over 30 percent
from 2000 to 2010. The austerity measures implemented by the Greek government are hitting
hard the Greek economy, since its growth is continuing to be expected negative also this year
(2012), making the financial recovery very problematic [Mussa (2010)]. Furthermore, Greece
exports are much less than imports, so the trade balance shows a deficit above 10%. Therefore,
the focus of economic policy of Greece should become its productive system and growth must
be the major goal for the Greek economy in a medium term perspective. This surely would help
its re-equilibrium process.
2.2 The soundest European economy: Germany
Germany, on the other hand, is considered the soundest European economy. It is the world’s
second-biggest exporter, but its wide commercial surplus is originated mainly by the exports
in the Euro area, that accounts for about two thirds. Furthermore, since 2000 its export share
has gradually increased vis-a`-vis industrial countries. Thus Germany’s growth path has been
driven by exports. We do not discuss in this work the factors explaining Germany’s increase in
export share, but we observe that its international competitiveness has been improving, with the
unit labor cost which has been kept fairly constant, since wages have essentially kept pace with
productivity. Therefore the prices of the German products have been relatively low, favoring
the export of German goods towards the euro countries and towards the markets around the
world, especially those of the emerging economies (China, India, Brazil, Russia). Finally, since
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2010 Germany has recovered very well from the 2008-2009 global crisis and it is growing at a
higher rate than the others Euro partners.
Therefore we share the view that Germany (and the other surplus countries of the Euro
area) should contribute to overcome the crisis of Greek economy stimulating its demand of
goods from Greece and relying less on exports towards the Euro area in general. Germany,
as some economists as Posen [2010] and Abadi [2010] underlined, has benefited from being the
anchor economy for the Eurozone over the last 11 years. For instance, in 2009, during a time of
global contraction, Germany has been a beneficiary, being able to run a sustained trade surplus
with its European neighbors. Germany is exporting to Greece far more than it imports.
2.3 A win-win solution for Greece and Germany
Thus we believe that an economic policy that aims at adjusting government budget and trade
imbalances and looks at improving the growth path of the real economy in the medium and long
term in Greece is the only possible one to assure a stable re-balancing of the Greek economy
and also to contribute to the stability of the whole euro area [Schiliro`, 2011]. As we have
already argued, German modest wage increases and weak domestic demand favored the export
of German goods towards the euro countries. We suggest, in accordance with Posen [2010], a
win-win solution (a win-win solution is the outcome of a game which is designed in a way that all
participants can profit from it in one way or the other), which entails that Germany, which still
represents the leading economy, should re-balance its trade surplus and thus ease the pressure on
the southern countries of the euro area, particularly Greece. Obviously, we are aware that this
is a mere hypothesis and that our framework of coopetition is a normative model. However, we
believe that a cooperative attitude must be taken within the members of the European monetary
union. Thus we pursue our hypothesis and suggest a model of coopetitive game as an innovative
instrument to analyze possible solutions to obtain a win-win outcome for Greece and Germany,
which would also help the whole economy of the euro area.
2.4 Our coopetitive model
The two strategic variables of our model are investments and exports for Greece, since this coun-
try must concentrate on them to improve the structure of production and its competitiveness, but
also shift its aggregate demand towards a higher growth path in the medium term. Thus Greece
should focus on innovative investments, specially investments in knowledge [Schiliro`, 2010], to
change and improve its production structure and to increase its production capacity and its pro-
ductivity. As a result of that its competitiveness will improve. An economic policy that focuses
on investments and exports, instead of consumptions, will address Greece towards a sustainable
growth and, consequently, its financial reputation and economic stability will also increase. On
the other hand, the strategic variable of our model for Germany are private consumption and
imports.
The idea which is driving our model to solve the Greek crisis is based on a notion of coope-
tition where the cooperative aspect will prevail. Thus we are not talking about a situation in
which Germany and Greece are competing in the same European market for the same products,
rather we are assuming a situation in which Germany stimulates its domestic demand and, in
doing so, will create a larger market for products from abroad. We are also envisaging the case
where Germany purchases a greater quantity of Greek products, in this case Greece increases
its exports, selling more products to Germany. The final results will be that Greece will find
itself in a better position, but also Germany will get an economic advantage determined by the
higher growth in the two countries. In addition, there is the important advantage of a greater
stability within the European Monetary system. Finally our model will provide a new set of
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tools based on the notion of coopetition, that could be fruitful for the setting of the euro area
economic policy issues.
2.5 The coopetition in our model
The concept of coopetition was essentially devised at micro-economic level for strategic man-
agement solutions by Brandenburger and Nalebuff [1995], who suggest, given the competitive
paradigm [Porter, 1985], to consider also a cooperative behavior to achieve a win-win outcome
for both players. Therefore, in our model, coopetition represents the synthesis between the com-
petitive paradigm [Porter, 1985] and the cooperative paradigm [Gulati, Nohria, Zaheer, 2000;
Stiles, 2001]. Coopetition is, in our approach, a complex theoretical construct and it is the result
of the interplay between competition and cooperation. Thus, we suggest a model of coopetitive
games, applied at a macroeconomic level, which intends to offer possible solutions to the par-
tially divergent interests of Germany and Greece in a perspective of a cooperative attitude that
should drive their policies.
3 Coopetitive games
3.1 Introduction
In this paper we develop and apply the mathematical model of a coopetitive game introduced
by David Carf`ı in [7] and [6]. The idea of coopetitive game is already used, in a mostly intuitive
and non-formalized way, in Strategic Management Studies (see for example Brandenburgher and
Nalebuff).
3.1.1 The idea.
A coopetitive game is a game in which two or more players (participants) can interact cooper-
atively and non-cooperatively at the same time. Even Brandenburger and Nalebuff, creators of
coopetition, did not define, precisely, a quantitative way to implement coopetition in the Game
Theory context.
The problem to implement the notion of coopetition in Game Theory is summarized in the
following question:
• how do, in normal form games, cooperative and non-cooperative interactions can live to-
gether simultaneously, in a Brandenburger-Nalebuff sense?
In order to explain the above question, consider a classic two-player normal-form gain game
G = (f,>) - such a game is a pair in which f is a vector valued function defined on a Cartesian
product E × F with values in the Euclidean plane R2 and > is the natural strict sup-order of
the Euclidean plane itself (the sup-order is indicating that the game, with payoff function f , is
a gain game and not a loss game). Let E and F be the strategy sets of the two players in the
game G. The two players can choose the respective strategies x ∈ E and y ∈ F
• cooperatively (exchanging information and making binding agreements);
• not-cooperatively (not exchanging information or exchanging information but without pos-
sibility to make binding agreements).
The above two behavioral ways are mutually exclusive, at least in normal-form games:
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• the two ways cannot be adopted simultaneously in the model of normal-form game (without
using convex probability mixtures, but this is not the way suggested by Brandenburger
and Nalebuff in their approach);
• there is no room, in the classic normal game model, for a simultaneous (non-probabilistic)
employment of the two behavioral extremes cooperation and non-cooperation.
3.1.2 Towards a possible solution.
David Carf`ı ([7] and [6]) has proposed a manner to pass this impasse, according to the idea of
coopetition in the sense of Brandenburger and Nalebuff. In a Carf`ı’s coopetitive game model,
• the players of the game have their respective strategy-sets (in which they can choose
cooperatively or not cooperatively);
• there is a common strategy set C containing other strategies (possibly of different type with
respect to those in the respective classic strategy sets) that must be chosen cooperatively ;
• the strategy set C can also be structured as a Cartesian product (similarly to the profile
strategy space of normal form games), but in any case the strategies belonging to this new
set C must be chosen cooperatively.
3.2 The model for n-players
We give in the following the definition of coopetitive game proposed by Carf`ı (in [7] and [6]).
Definition (of n-player coopetitive game). Let E = (Ei)
n
i=1 be a finite n-family of non-
empty sets and let C be another non-empty set. We define n-player coopetitive gain game
over the strategy support (E,C) any pair G = (f,>), where f is a vector function from the
Cartesian product ×E×C (here ×E denotes the classic strategy-profile space of n-player normal
form games, i.e. the Cartesian product of the family E) into the n-dimensional Euclidean space
Rn and > is the natural sup-order of this last Euclidean space. The element of the set C will be
called cooperative strategies of the game.
A particular aspect of our coopetitive game model is that any coopetitive game G determines
univocally a family of classic normal-form games and vice versa; so that any coopetitive game
could be defined as a family of normal-form games. In what follows we precise this very important
aspect of the model.
Definition (the family of normal-form games associated with a coopetitive game).
Let G = (f,>) be a coopetitive game over a strategic support (E,C). And let
g = (gz)z∈C
be the family of classic normal-form games whose member gz is, for any cooperative strategy z
in C, the normal-form game
Gz := (f(., z), >),
where the payoff function f(., z) is the section
f(., z) : ×E → Rn
of the function f , defined (as usual) by
f(., z)(x) = f(x, z),
for every point x in the strategy profile space ×E. We call the family g (so defined) family
of normal-form games associated with (or determined by) the game G and we call
normal section of the game G any member of the family g.
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We can prove this (obvious) theorem.
Theorem. The family g of normal-form games associated with a coopetitive game G uniquely
determines the game. In more rigorous and complete terms, the correspondence G 7→ g is a
bijection of the space of all coopetitive games - over the strategy support (E,C) - onto the space
of all families of normal form games - over the strategy support E - indexed by the set C.
Proof. This depends totally from the fact that we have the following natural bijection between
function spaces:
F(×E × C,Rn)→ F(C,F(×E,Rn)) : f 7→ (f(., z))z∈C ,
which is a classic result of theory of sets. 
Thus, the exam of a coopetitive game should be equivalent to the exam of a whole family of
normal-form games (in some sense we shall specify).
In this paper we suggest how this latter examination can be conducted and what are the
solutions corresponding to the main concepts of solution which are known in the literature for
the classic normal-form games, in the case of two-player coopetitive games.
3.3 Two players coopetitive games
In this section we specify the definition and related concepts of two-player coopetitive games;
sometimes (for completeness) we shall repeat some definitions of the preceding section.
Definition (of coopetitive game). Let E, F and C be three nonempty sets. We define
two player coopetitive gain game carried by the strategic triple (E,F,C) any pair of
the form G = (f,>), where f is a function from the Cartesian product E × F × C into the
real Euclidean plane R2 and the binary relation > is the usual sup-order of the Cartesian plane
(defined component-wise, for every couple of points p and q, by p > q iff pi > qi, for each index
i).
Remark (coopetitive games and normal form games). The difference among a two-
player normal-form (gain) game and a two player coopetitive (gain) game is the fundamental
presence of the third strategy Cartesian-factor C. The presence of this third set C determines
a total change of perspective with respect to the usual exam of two-player normal form games,
since we now have to consider a normal form game G(z), for every element z of the set C; we
have, then, to study an entire ordered family of normal form games in its own totality, and we
have to define a new manner to study these kind of game families.
3.4 Terminology and notation
Definitions. Let G = (f,>) be a two player coopetitive gain game carried by the strategic triple
(E,F,C). We will use the following terminologies:
• the function f is called the payoff function of the game G;
• the first component f1 of the payoff function f is called payoff function of the first
player and analogously the second component f2 is called payoff function of the second
player;
• the set E is said strategy set of the first player and the set F the strategy set of
the second player;
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• the set C is said the cooperative (or common) strategy set of the two players;
• the Cartesian product E×F ×C is called the (coopetitive) strategy space of the game
G.
Memento. The first component f1 of the payoff function f of a coopetitive game G is the
function of the strategy space E × F ×C of the game G into the real line R defined by the first
projection
f1(x, y, z) := pr1(f(x, y, z)),
for every strategic triple (x, y, z) in E × F × C; in a similar fashion we proceed for the second
component f2 of the function f .
Interpretation. We have:
• two players, or better an ordered pair (1, 2) of players;
• anyone of the two players has a strategy set in which to choose freely his own strategy;
• the two players can/should cooperatively choose strategies z in a third common strategy
set C;
• the two players will choose (after the exam of the entire game G) their cooperative strategy
z in order to maximize (in some sense we shall define) the vector gain function f .
3.5 Normal form games of a coopetitive game
Let G be a coopetitive game in the sense of above definitions. For any cooperative strategy z
selected in the cooperative strategy space C, there is a corresponding normal form gain game
Gz = (p(z), >),
upon the strategy pair (E,F ), where the payoff function p(z) is the section
f(., z) : E × F → R2,
of the payoff function f of the coopetitive game - the section is defined, as usual, on the com-
petitive strategy space E × F , by
f(., z)(x, y) = f(x, y, z),
for every bi-strategy (x, y) in the bi-strategy space E × F .
Let us formalize the concept of game-family associated with a coopetitive game.
Definition (the family associated with a coopetitive game). Let G = (f,>) be a two
player coopetitive gain game carried by the strategic triple (E,F,C). We naturally can associate
with the game G a family g = (gz)z∈C of normal-form games defined by
gz := Gz = (f(., z), >),
for every z in C, which we shall call the family of normal-form games associated with
the coopetitive game G.
Remark. It is clear that with any above family of normal form games
g = (gz)z∈C ,
with gz = (f(., z), >), we can associate:
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• a family of payoff spaces
(imf(., z))z∈C ,
with members in the payoff universe R2;
• a family of Pareto maximal boundary
(∂∗Gz)z∈C ,
with members contained in the payoff universe R2;
• a family of suprema
(supGz)z∈C ,
with members belonging to the payoff universe R2;
• a family of Nash zones
(N (Gz))z∈C ;
with members contained in the strategy space E × F ;
• a family of conservative bi-values
v# = (v#z )z∈C ;
in the payoff universe R2.
And so on, for every meaningful known feature of a normal form game.
Moreover, we can interpret any of the above families as set-valued paths in the strategy space
E × F or in the payoff universe R2.
It is just the study of these induced families which becomes of great interest in the examina-
tion of a coopetitive game G and which will enable us to define (or suggest) the various possible
solutions of a coopetitive game.
4 Solutions of a coopetitive game
4.1 Introduction
The two players of a coopetitive game G - according to the general economic principles of
monotonicity of preferences and of non-satiation - should choose the cooperative strategy z in
C in order that:
• the reasonable Nash equilibria of the game Gz are f -preferable than the reasonable Nash
equilibria in each other game Gz′ ;
• the supremum of Gz is greater (in the sense of the usual order of the Cartesian plane) than
the supremum of any other game Gz′ ;
• the Pareto maximal boundary of Gz is higher than that of any other game Gz′ ;
• the Nash bargaining solutions in Gz are f -preferable than those in Gz′ ;
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• in general, fixed a common kind of solution for any game Gz, say S(z) the set of these kind
of solutions for the game Gz, we can consider the problem to find all the optimal solutions
(in the sense of Pareto) of the set valued path S, defined on the cooperative strategy set C.
Then, we should face the problem of selection of reasonable Pareto strategies in the
set-valued path S via proper selection methods (Nash-bargaining, Kalai-Smorodinsky and
so on).
Moreover, we shall consider the maximal Pareto boundary of the payoff space im(f) as an
appropriate zone for the bargaining solutions.
The payoff function of a two person coopetitive game is (as in the case of normal-form game)
a vector valued function with values belonging to the Cartesian plane R2. We note that in
general the above criteria are multi-criteria and so they will generate multi-criteria optimization
problems.
In this section we shall define rigorously some kind of solution, for two player coopetitive
games, based on a bargaining method, namely a Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining type. Hence,
first of all, we have to precise what kind of bargaining method we are going to use.
4.2 Bargaining problems
In this paper, we shall propose and use the following original extended (and quite general) defi-
nition of bargaining problem and, consequently, a natural generalization of Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution. In the economic literature, several examples of extended bargaining problems and ex-
tended Kalai-Smorodinski solutions are already presented. The essential root of these various
extended versions of bargaining problems is the presence of utopia points not-directly constructed
by the disagreement points and the strategy constraints. Moreover, the Kalai-type solution, of
such extended bargaining problems, is always defined as a Pareto maximal point belonging to
the segment joining the disagreement point with the utopia point (if any such Pareto point
does exist): we shall follow the same way. In order to find suitable new win-win solutions of
our realistic coopetitive economic problems, we need such new kind of versatile extensions. For
what concerns the existence of our new extended Kalai solutions, for the economic problems
we are facing, we remark that conditions of compactness and strict convexity will naturally
hold; we remark, otherwise, that, in this paper, we are not interested in proving general or
deep mathematical results, but rather to find reasonable solutions for new economic coopetitive
context.
Definition (of bargaining problem). Let S be a subset of the Cartesian plane R2 and let
a and b be two points of the plane with the following properties:
• they belong to the small interval containing S, if this interval is defined (indeed, it is well
defined if and only if S is bounded and it is precisely the interval [inf S, supS]≤);
• they are such that a < b;
• the intersection
[a, b]≤ ∩ ∂∗S,
among the interval [a, b]≤ with end points a and b (it is the set of points greater than a and
less than b, it is not the segment [a, b]) and the maximal boundary of S is non-empty.
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In this conditions, we call bargaining problem on S corresponding to the pair of
extreme points (a, b), the pair
P = (S, (a, b)).
Every point in the intersection among the interval [a, b]≤ and the Pareto maximal boundary
of S is called possible solution of the problem P . Some time the first extreme point of a
bargaining problem is called the initial point of the problem (or disagreement point or
threat point) and the second extreme point of a bargaining problem is called utopia point of
the problem.
In the above conditions, when S is convex, the problem P is said to be convex and for this
case we can find in the literature many existence results for solutions of P enjoying prescribed
properties (Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, Nash bargaining solutions and so on ...).
Remark. Let S be a subset of the Cartesian plane R2 and let a and b two points of the
plane belonging to the smallest interval containing S and such that a ≤ b. Assume the Pareto
maximal boundary of S be non-empty. If a and b are a lower bound and an upper bound of the
maximal Pareto boundary, respectively, then the intersection
[a, b]≤ ∩ ∂∗S
is obviously not empty. In particular, if a and b are the extrema of S (or the extrema of the
Pareto boundary S∗ = ∂∗S) we can consider the following bargaining problem
P = (S, (a, b)), (or P = (S∗, (a, b)))
and we call this particular problem a standard bargaining problem on S (or standard bargaining
problem on the Pareto maximal boundary S∗).
4.3 Kalai solution for bargaining problems
Note the following property.
Property. If (S, (a, b)) is a bargaining problem with a < b, then there is at most one point
in the intersection
[a, b] ∩ ∂∗S,
where [a, b] is the segment joining the two points a and b.
Proof. Since if a point p of the segment [a, b] belongs to the Pareto boundary ∂∗S, no other
point of the segment itself can belong to Pareto boundary, since the segment is a totally ordered
subset of the plane (remember that a < b). 
Definition (Kalai-Smorodinsky). We call Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (or best com-
promise solution) of the bargaining problem (S, (a, b)) the unique point of the intersection
[a, b] ∩ ∂∗S,
if this intersection is non empty.
So, in the above conditions, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution k (if it exists) enjoys the following
property: there is a real r in [0, 1] such that
k = a + r(b− a),
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or
k − a = r(b− a),
hence
k2 − a2
k1 − a1 =
b2 − a2
b1 − a1 ,
if the above ratios are defined; these last equality is the characteristic property of Kalai-
Smorodinsky solutions.
We end the subsection with the following definition.
Definition (of Pareto boundary). We call Pareto boundary every subset M of an
ordered space which has only pairwise incomparable elements.
4.4 Nash (proper) solution of a coopetitive game
Let N := N (G) be the union of the Nash-zone family of a coopetitive game G, that is the union
of the family (N (Gz))z∈C of all Nash-zones of the game family g = (gz)z∈C associated to the
coopetitive game G. We call Nash path of the game G the multi-valued path
z 7→ N (Gz)
and Nash zone of G the trajectory N of the above multi-path. Let N∗ be the Pareto maximal
boundary of the Nash zone N . We can consider the bargaining problem
PN = (N∗, inf(N∗), sup(N∗)).
Definition. If the above bargaining problem PN has a Kalai-Smorodinsky solution k, we say
that k is the properly coopetitive solution of the coopetitive game G.
The term “properly coopetitive” is clear:
• this solution k is determined by cooperation on the common strategy set C and to be selfish
(competitive in the Nash sense) on the bi-strategy space E × F .
4.5 Bargaining solutions of a coopetitive game
It is possible, for coopetitive games, to define other kind of solutions, which are not properly
coopetitive, but realistic and sometime affordable. These kind of solutions are, we can say,
super-cooperative.
Let us show some of these kind of solutions.
Consider a coopetitive game G and
• its Pareto maximal boundary M and the corresponding pair of extrema (aM , bM );
• the Nash zone N (G) of the game in the payoff space and its extrema (aN , bN );
• the conservative set-value G# (the set of all conservative values of the family g associated
with the coopetitive game G) and its extrema (a#, b#).
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We call:
• Pareto compromise solution of the game G the best compromise solution (K-S solu-
tion) of the problem
(M, (aM , bM )),
if this solution exists;
• Nash-Pareto compromise solution of the game G the best compromise solution of
the problem
(M, (bN , bM ))
if this solution exists;
• conservative-Pareto compromise solution of the game G the best compromise of
the problem
(M, (b#, bM ))
if this solution exists.
4.6 Transferable utility solutions
Other possible compromises we suggest are the following.
Consider the transferable utility Pareto boundary M of the coopetitive game G, that is the
set of all points p in the Euclidean plane (universe of payoffs), between the extrema of G, such
that their sum
+(p) := p1 + p2
is equal to the maximum value of the addition + of the real line R over the payoff space
f(E × F × C) of the game G.
Definition (TU Pareto solution). We call transferable utility compromise solution
of the coopetitive game G the solution of any bargaining problem (M, (a, b)), where
• a and b are points of the smallest interval containing the payoff space of G
• b is a point strongly greater than a;
• M is the transferable utility Pareto boundary of the game G;
• the points a and b belong to different half-planes determined by M .
Note that the above fourth axiom is equivalent to require that the segment joining the points
a and b intersect M .
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4.7 Win-win solutions
In the applications, if the game G has a member G0 of its family which can be considered as
an “initial game” - in the sense that the pre-coopetitive situation is represented by this normal
form game G0 - the aims of our study (following the standard ideas on coopetitive interactions)
are
• to “enlarge the pie”;
• to obtain a win-win solution with respect to the initial situation.
So that we will choose as a threat point a in TU problem (M, (a, b)) the supremum of the
initial game G0.
Definition (of win-win solution). Let (G, z0) be a coopetitive game with an initial
point, that is a coopetitive game G with a fixed common strategy z0 (of its common strategy set
C). We call the game Gz0 as the initial game of (G, z0). We call win-win solution of the
game (G, z0) any strategy profile s = (x, y, z) such that the payoff of G at s is strictly greater
than the supremum L of the payoff core of the initial game G(z0).
Remark 1. The payoff core of a normal form gain game G is the portion of the Pareto
maximal boundary G∗ of the game which is greater than the conservative bi-value of G.
Remark 2. From an applicative point of view, the above requirement (to be strictly greater
than L) is very strong. More realistically, we can consider as win-win solutions those strategy
profiles which are strictly greater than any reasonable solution of the initial game Gz0 .
Remark 3. Strictly speaking, a win-win solution could be not Pareto efficient: it is a
situation in which the players both gain with respect to an initial condition (and this is exactly
the idea we follow in the rigorous definition given above).
Remark 4. In particular, observe that, if the collective payoff function
+(f) = f1 + f2
has a maximum (on the strategy profile space S) strictly greater than the collective payoff L1+L2
at the supremum L of the payoff core of the game Gz0 , the portion M(> L) of Transferable
Utility Pareto boundary M which is greater than L is non-void and it is a segment. So that we
can choose as a threat point a in our problem (M, (a, b)) the supremum L of the payoff core of
the initial game G0 to obtain some compromise solution.
4.7.1 Standard win-win solution.
A natural choice for the utopia point b is the supremum of the portion M≥a of the transferable
utility Pareto boundary M which is upon (greater than) this point a:
M≥a = {m ∈M : m ≥ a}.
4.7.2 Non standard win-win solution.
Another kind of solution can be obtained by choosing b as the supremum of the portion of M
that is bounded between the minimum and maximum value of that player i that gains more in
the coopetitive interaction, in the sense that
max(pri(imf))−max(pri(imf0)) > max(pr3−i(imf))−max(pr3−i(imf0)).
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4.7.3 Final general remark
In the development of a coopetitive game, we consider:
• a first virtual phase, in which the two players make a binding agreement on what cooper-
ative strategy z should be selected from the cooperative set C, in order to respect their
own rationality.
• then, a second virtual phase, in which the two players choose their strategies forming the
profile (x, y) to implement in the game G(z).
Now, in the second phase of our coopetitive game G we consider the following 4 possibilities:
1. the two players are non-cooperative in the second phase and they do or do not exchange
info, but the players choose (in any case) Nash equilibrium strategies for the game G(z);
in this case, for some rationality reason, the two players have devised that the chosen
equilibrium is the better equilibrium choice in the entire game G; we have here only one
binding agreement in the entire development of the game;
2. the two players are cooperative also in the second phase and they make a biding agreement
in order to choose a Pareto payoff on the coopetitive Pareto boundary; in this case we need
two binding agreements in the entire development of the game;
3. the two players are cooperative also in the second phase and they make two biding agree-
ments, in order to reach the Pareto payoff (on the coopetitive Pareto boundary) with
maximum collective gain (first agreement) and to share the collective gain according to a
certain subdivision (second agreement); in this case we need three binding agreements in
the entire development of the game;
4. the two players are non-cooperative in the second phase (and they do or do not exchange
information), the player choose (in any case) Nash equilibrium strategies; the two players
have devised that the chosen equilibrium is the equilibrium with maximum collective gain
and they make only one binding agreement to share the collective gain according to a
certain subdivision; in this case we need two binding agreements in the entire development
of the game.
5 Coopetitive games for Greek crisis
Our first hypothesis is that Germany must stimulate the domestic demand and to re-balance
its trade surplus in favor of Greece. The second hypothesis is that Greece, a country with a
declining competitiveness of its products and a small export share, aims at growth by undertak-
ing innovative investments and by increasing its exports primarily towards Germany and also
towards the other euro countries.
The coopetitive model that we propose hereunder must be interpreted as a normative model,
in the sense that it shows the more appropriate solutions of a win-win strategy chosen by
considering both competitive and cooperative behaviors.
The strategy spaces of the two models are:
• the strategy set of Germany E, set of all possible consumptions of Germany, in our model,
given in conventional monetary unit; we shall assume that the strategies of Germany
directly influence only Germany pay-off;
• the strategy set of Greece F , set of all possible investments of Greece, in our model,
given in conventional monetary unit; we shall assume that the strategies of Greece directly
influence only Greece pay-off;
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• a shared strategy set C, whose elements are determined together by the two countries,
when they choose their own respective strategies x and y, Germany and Greece. Every
z in C represents an amount - given in conventional monetary unit - of Greek exports
imported by Germany.
Therefore, in the two models we assume that Germany and Greece define the set of coopetitive
strategies.
6 The first model
Main Strategic assumptions. We assume that:
• any real number x, belonging to the unit interval U := [0, 1], can represent a consumption
of Germany (given in a appropriate conventional monetary unit);
• any real number y, in the same unit interval U , can represent an investment of Greece
(given in another appropriate conventional monetary unit);
• any real number z, again in U , can be the amount of Greek exports which is imported by
Germany (given in conventional monetary unit).
6.1 Payoff function of Germany
We assume that the payoff function of Germany f1 is its gross domestic demand :
• f1 is equal to the private consumption function C1 plus the gross investment function I1
plus government spending (that we shall assume equal 0, or constant) plus export function
X1 minus the import function M1, that is
f1 = C1 + I1 + X1 −M1.
We assume that:
• the private consumption function C1 is the first projection of the strategic Cartesian cube
U3, that is defined by
C1(x, y, z) = x,
for every consumption x in U , since we assume the private consumption of Germany the
first strategic component of strategy profiles in U3;
• the gross investment function I1 is constant on the cube U3, and by translation we can
suppose I1 equal zero;
• the export function X1 is defined by
X1(x, y, z) = (1 + x)
−1,
for every consumption x of Germany; so we assume that the export function X1 is a strictly
decreasing function with respect to the first argument;
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• the import function M1 is the third projection of the strategic cube, namely
M1(x, y, z) = z,
for every z ∈ U , because we assume the import function M1 depending only upon the
cooperative strategy z of the coopetitive game G, our third strategic component of the
strategy profiles in U3.
Recap. We then assume as payoff function of Germany its gross domestic demand f1,
which in our model is equal, at every triple (x, y, z) in the strategic cube U3, to the sum of the
strategies x, −z with the export function X1, viewed as a reaction function with respect to the
German domestic consumption (so that f1 is the difference of the first and third projection of
the Cartesian product U3 plus the function export function X1).
Concluding, the payoff function of Germany is the function f1 of the cube U
3 into the real
line R, defined by
f1(x, y, z) = x + 1/(x + 1)− z,
for every triple (x, y, z) in the cube U3; where the reaction function X1, defined from the unit
interval U into the real line R by
X1(x) = 1/(x + 1),
for every consumption x of Germany in the interval U , is the export function of Germany
mapping the level x of consumption into the level X1(x) of German export corresponding to
that consumption level x.
The function X1 is a strictly decreasing function, and only this monotonicity is the relevant
property of X1 for our coopetitive model.
6.2 Payoff function of Greece
We assume that the payoff function of Greece f2 is again its gross domestic demand - private
consumption C2 plus gross investment I2 plus government spending (assumed to be 0) plus
exports X2 minus imports M2),
f2 = C2 + I2 + X2 −M2.
We assume that:
• the function C2 is irrelevant in our analysis, since we assume the private consumption
independent from the choice of the strategic triple (x, y, z) in the cube U3, in other terms
we assume the function C2 constant on the cube U
3 and by translation we can suppose
C2 itself equal zero;
• the function I2 is defined by
I2(x, y, z) = y + nz,
for every (x, y, z) in U3 (see later for the justification);
• the export function X2 is the linear function defined by
X2(x, y, z) = z + my,
for every (x, y, z) in U3 (see later for the justification);
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• the function M2 is irrelevant in our analysis, since we assume the import function inde-
pendent from the choice of the triple (x, y, z) in U3, in other terms we assume the import
function M2 constant on the cube U
3 and, by translation, we can suppose the import M2
equal zero.
So the payoff function of Greece is the linear function f2 of the cube U
3 into the real line R,
defined by
f2(x, y, z) = (y + nz) + (z + my) = (1 + m)y + (1 + n)z,
for every pair (x, y, z) in the strategic Cartesian cube U3.
We note that the function f2 does not depend upon the strategies x in U chosen by Germany
and that f2 is a linear function.
The definition of the functions investment I2 and export X2 must be studied deeply and
carefully, and are fundamental to find the win-win solution.
• For every investment strategy y in U , the term my represents the quantity (monetary)
effect of the Greek investment y on the Greek exports. In fact, the investments, specially
innovative investments, contribute at improving the competitiveness of Greek goods, fa-
voring the exports.
• For every cooperative strategy z in U , the term nz is the cross-effect of the cooperative
variable z representing the additive level of investment required to support the production
of the production z itself.
• We assume the factors m and n strictly positive.
6.3 Payoff function of the game
We so have build up a coopetitive gain game with payoff function given by
f(x, y, z) = (x + 1/(x + 1)− z, (1 + m)y + (1 + n)z) =
= (x + 1/(x + 1), (1 + m)y) + z(−1, 1 + n)
for every x, y, z in [0, 1].
6.4 Study of the game G = (f,>)
Note that, fixed a cooperative strategy z in U , the section game G(z) = (p(z), >) with payoff
function p(z), defined on the square U × U by
p(z)(x, y) = f(x, y, z),
is the translation of the game G(0) by the “cooperative” vector
v(z) = z(−1, 1 + n),
so that we can study the initial game G(0) and then we can translate the various informations
of the game G(0) by the vector v(z).
So, let us consider the initial game G(0). The strategy square S = U2 of G(0) has vertices
02, e1, 12 and e2, where 02 is the origin, e1 is the first canonical vector (1, 0), 12 is the sum of
the two canonical vectors (1, 1) and e2 is the second canonical vector (0, 1).
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Figure 1: 3D representation of the initial game (f(., 0), <).
Figure 2: 3D representation of the initial game (f(., 0), <).
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6.5 Topological Boundary of the payoff space of G0
In order to determine the Pareto boundary of the payoff space, we shall use the technics intro-
duced by D. Carf`ı in [5]. We have
p0(x, y) = (x + 1/(x + 1), (1 + m)y),
for every x, y in [0, 1]. The transformation of the side [0, e1] is the trace of the (parametric)
curve c : U → R2 defined by
c(x) = f(x, 0, 0) = (x + 1/(x + 1), 0),
that is the segment
[f(0), f(e1)] = [(1, 0), (3/2, 0)].
The transformation of the segment [0, e2] is the trace of the curve c : U → R2 defined by
c(y) = f(0, y, 0) = (1, (1 + m)y),
that is the segment
[f(0), f(e2)] = [(1, 0), (1, 1 + m)].
The transformation of the segment [e1, 12] is the trace of the curve c : U → R2 defined by
c(y) = f(1, y, 0) = (1 + 1/2, (1 + m)y),
that is the segment
[f(e1), f(12)] = [(3/2, 0), (3/2, 1 + m)].
Critical zone of G(0). The Critical zone of the game G(0) is empty. Indeed the Jacobian
matrix is
Jf (x, y) =
(
1 + (1 + x)−2 0
0 1 + m
)
,
which is invertible for every x, y in U .
Payoff space of the game G(0). So, the payoff space of the game G(0) is the transformation
of the topological boundary of the strategic square, that is the rectangle with vertices f(0, 0),
f(e1), f(1, 1) and f(e2).
Nash equilibria. The unique Nash equilibrium is the bistrategy (1, 1). Indeed,
1 + (1 + x)−2 > 0
so the function f1 is increasing with respect to the first argument and analogously
1 + m > 0
so that the Nash equilibrium is (1, 1).
6.6 The payoff space of the coopetitive game G
The image of the payoff function f , is the union of the family of payoff spaces
(impz)z∈C ,
that is the convex envelope of the union of the image p0(S) (S is the square U × U) and of its
translation by the vector v(1), namely the payoff space p1(S): the image of f is an hexagon with
vertices f(0, 0), f(e1), f(1, 1) and their translations by v(1).
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Figure 3: Initial payoff space of the game (f,<).
Figure 4: Payoff space of the game (f,<).
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6.7 Pareto maximal boundary of payoff space of G
The Pareto sup-boundary of the coopetitive payoffspace f(S) is the segment [P ′, Q′], where
P ′ = f(1, 1) and
Q′ = P ′ + v(1).
Possibility of global growth. It is important to note that the absolute slope of the Pareto
(coopetitive) boundary is 1 + n. Thus the collective payoff f1 + f2 of the game is not constant
on the Pareto boundary and, therefore, the game implies the possibility of a global growth.
Trivial bargaining solutions. The Nash bargaining solution on the segment [P ′, Q′] with
respect to the infimum of the Pareto boundary and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
on the segment [P ′, Q′], with respect to the infimum and the supremum of the Pareto boundary,
coincide with the medium point of the segment [P ′, Q′]. This solution is not acceptable from
Germany point of view, it is collectively better than the supremum of G0 but it is disadvantageous
for Germany (it suffers a loss!): this solution can be thought as a rebalancing solution but it is
not realistically implementable.
6.8 Transferable utility solution
In this coopetitive context it is more convenient to adopt a transferable utility solution, indeed:
• the point of maximum collective gain on the whole of the coopetitive payoff space is the
point
Q′ = (1/2, 2 + m + n).
6.8.1 Rebalancing win-win best compromise solution
Thus we propose a rebalancing win-win kind of coopetitive solution, as it follows (in the case
m = 0):
1. we consider the portion s of transferable utility Pareto boundary
M := (0, 5/2 + n) + R(1,−1),
obtained by intersecting M itself with the strip determined (spanned by convexifying) by
the straight lines e2 + Re1 and
(2 + n)e2 + Re1,
these are the straight lines of maximum gain for Greece in games G(0) and G respectively.
2. we consider the Kalai-Smorodinsky segment s′ of vertices (3/2, 1) - supremum of the game
G(0) - and the supremum of the segment s.
3. our best payoff coopetitive compromise is the unique point K in the intersection of segments
s and s′, that is the best compromise solution of the bargaining problem
(s, (supG0, sup s)).
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Figure 5: Two Kalai win-win solutions of the game (f,<), represented with n = 1/2.
6.9 Win-win solution
This best payoff coopetitive compromise K represents a win-win solution with respect to the
initial supremum (3/2, 1). So that, as we repeatedly said, also Germany can increase its initial
profit from coopetition.
Win-win strategy procedure. The win-win payoff K can be obtained (by chance) in a
properly coopetitive fashion in the following way:
• 1) the two players agree on the cooperative strategy 1 of the common set C;
• 2) the two players implement their respective Nash strategies of game G(1); the unique
Nash equilibrium of G(1) is the bistrategy (1, 1);
• 3) finally, they share the “social pie”
5/2 + n = (f1 + f2)(1, 1, 1),
in a cooperative fashion (by contract) according to the decomposition K.
7 The second model
In this second model, we consider a linear affine mutual interaction, more adherent to the real
state of the Euro-area.
7.0.1 Main Strategic assumptions.
We assume that:
• any real number x, belonging to the interval E := [0, 3], represents a possible consumption
of Germany (given in an appropriate conventional monetary unit);
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• any real number y, in the same interval F := E, represents a possible investment of Greece
(given in another appropriate conventional monetary unit);
• any real number z, again in the interval C = [0, 2], can be the amount of Greek exports
which is imported by Germany (given in conventional monetary unit).
7.1 Payoff function of Germany
We assume that the payoff function of Germany f1 is its Keynesian gross domestic demand :
• f1 is equal to the private consumption function C1 plus the gross investment function I1
plus government spending (that we shall assume equal 2, constant in our interaction) plus
export function X1 minus the import function M1, that is
f1 = 2 + C1 + I1 + X1 −M1.
We assume that:
• the German private consumption function C1 is the first projection of the strategic coopet-
itive space S := E2 × C, that is defined by
C1(x, y, z) = x,
for every possible german consumption x in E, this because we assumed the private con-
sumption of Germany to be the first strategic component of strategy profiles in S;
• the gross investment function I1 is constant on the space S, and by translation we can
suppose I1 equal zero;
• the export function X1 is defined by
X1(x, y, z) = −y/3,
for every Greek possible investment y in innovative technology; so we assume that the
export function X1 is a strictly decreasing function with respect to the second argument;
• the import function M1 is the third projection of the strategic space, namely
M1(x, y, z) = z,
for every cooperative strategy z ∈ 2U , because we assume the import function M1 depend-
ing only upon the cooperative strategy z of the coopetitive game G, our third strategic
component of the strategy profiles in S.
Recap. We then assume as payoff function of Germany its Keynesian gross domestic demand
f1, which in our model is equal, at every triple (x, y, z) in the profile strategy set S, to the sum
of the strategies x, −z with the export function X1, viewed as a reaction function to the Greece
investments (so that f1 is the difference of the first and third projection of the strategy profile
space S plus the function export function X1).
Concluding, the payoff function of Germany is the function f1 of the set S into the real line
R, defined by
f1(x, y, z) = 2 + x− y/3− z,
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for every triple (x, y, z) in the space S; where the reaction function X1, defined from the space
S into the real line R by
X1(x, y, z) = −y/3,
for every possible investment y of Greece in the interval 3U , is the export function of Ger-
many mapping the level y of Greece investment into the level X1(x, y, z) of German export,
corresponding to the Greece investment level y.
The function X1 is a strictly decreasing function in the second argument, and this mono-
tonicity is a relevant property of X1 for our coopetitive model.
7.2 Payoff function of Greece
We assume that the payoff function of Greece f2 is again its Keynesian gross domestic demand
- private consumption C2 plus gross investment I2 plus government spending (assumed to be 2)
plus exports X2 minus imports M2), so that
f2 = 2 + C2 + I2 + X2 −M2.
We assume that:
• the function C2 is irrelevant in our analysis, since we assume the Greek private consump-
tions independent from the choice of the strategic triple (x, y, z) in the space S; in other
terms, we assume the function C2 constant on the space S and by translation we can
suppose C2 itself equal zero;
• the function I2 : S → R is defined by
I2(x, y, z) = y + nz,
for every (x, y, z) in S (see above for the justification);
• the export function X2 is the linear function defined by
X2(x, y, z) = z + my,
for every (x, y, z) in S (see above for the justification);
• the function M2 is now relevant in our analysis, since we assume the import function, by
coopetitive contract with Germany, dependent on the choice of the triple (x, y, z) in S,
specifically, we assume the import function M2 defined on the space S by
M2(x, y, z) := −2x/3,
so, Greece too now, must import some German product, with value −2x/3 for each possible
German consumption x.
So, the payoff function of Greece is the linear function f2 of the space S into the real line R,
defined by
f2(x, y, z) = 2− 2x/3 + (y + nz) + (z + my) =
= 2− 2x/3 + (1 + m)y + (1 + n)z,
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for every pair (x, y, z) in the strategic Cartesian space S.
We note that the function f2 depends now significantly upon the strategies x in E, chosen
by Germany, and that f2 is again a linear function.
We shall assume the factors m and n non-negative and equal respectively (only for simplicity)
to 0 and 1/2.
7.3 Payoff function of the game
We so have build up a coopetitive gain game with payoff function f : S → R2, given by
f(x, y, z) = (2 + x− y/3− z, 2− 2x/3 + (1 + m)y + (1 + n)z) =
= (2, 2) + (x− y/3,−2x/3 + (1 + m)y) + z(−1, 1 + n),
for every (x, y, z) in [0, 3]2 × [0, 2].
Figure 6: 3D representation of (f,<).
7.4 Study of the second game G = (f,>)
Note that, fixed a cooperative strategy z in 2U , the section game G(z) = (p(z), >) with payoff
function p(z), defined on the square E2 by
p(z)(x, y) := f(x, y, z),
is the translation of the game G(0) by the “cooperative” vector
v(z) = z(−1, 1 + n),
so that, we can study the initial game G(0) and then we can translate the various informations
of the game G(0) by the vectors v(z), to obtain the corresponding information for the game
G(z).
So, let us consider the initial game G(0). The strategy square E2 of G(0) has vertices 02,
3e1, 32 and 3e2, where 02 is the origin of the plane R2, e1 is the first canonical vector (1, 0), 32
is the vectors (3, 3) and e2 is the second canonical vector.
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Figure 7: 3D representation of (f,<).
Figure 8: 3D representation of (f,<).
26
7.5 Topological Boundary of the payoff space of G0
In order to determine the the payoff space of the linear game it is sufficient to transform the
four vertices of the strategy square (the game is an affine invertible game), the critical zone is
empty.
7.5.1 Payoff space of the game G(0).
So, the payoff space of the game G(0) is the transformation of the topological boundary of the
strategy square, that is the parallelogram with vertices f(0, 0), f(3e1), f(3, 3) and f(3e2). As
we show in the below figure 9.
B' = (4,3)
C' = (1,5)
D' = (2,2)
A' = (5,0)
Figure 9: Initial payoff space of the game (f,<).
7.5.2 Nash equilibria.
The unique Nash equilibrium is the bistrategy (3, 3). Indeed, the function f1 is linear increasing
with respect to the first argument and analogously the function f2 is linear and increasing with
respect to the second argument.
7.6 The payoff space of the coopetitive game G
The image of the payoff function f , is the union of the family of payoff spaces
(impz)z∈C ,
that is the convex envelope of the union of the image p0(E
2) and of its translation by the vector
v(2), namely the payoff space p2(E
2): the image of f is an hexagon with vertices f(0, 0), f(3e1),
f(3, 3) and their translations by v(2). As we show below.
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B' = P' = (4,3)
C'
D' = (2,2)
A' = (5,0)
Q' = B'' = (2,6)
C'' = (-1,8)
D'' = (0,5)
Figure 10: Payoff space of the game (f,<).
7.7 Pareto maximal boundary of the payoff space of G
The Pareto sup-boundary of the coopetitive payoff space f(S) is union of the segments [A′, B′],
[P ′, Q′] and [Q′, C ′′], where P ′ = f(3, 3, 0) and
Q′ = P ′ + v(2).
7.7.1 Possibility of global growth.
It is important to note that the absolute slopes of the segments [A′, B′], [P ′, Q′] of the Pareto
(coopetitive) boundary are strictly greater than 1. Thus the collective payoff f1+f2 of the game
is not constant on the Pareto boundary and, therefore, the game implies the possibility of a
transferable utility global growth.
7.7.2 Trivial bargaining solutions.
The Nash bargaining solution on the entire payoff space, with respect to the infimum of the
Pareto boundary and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution, with respect to the infimum
and the supremum of the Pareto boundary, are not acceptable for Germany: they are collectively
(TU) better than the Nash payoff of G0 but they are disadvantageous for Germany (it suffers a
loss!): these solutions could be thought as rebalancing solutions, but they are not realistically
implementable.
7.8 Transferable utility solutions
In this coopetitive context it is more convenient to adopt a transferable utility solution, indeed:
• the point of maximum collective gain on the whole of the coopetitive payoff space is the
point Q′ = (2, 6).
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7.8.1 Rebalancing win-win solution relative to maximum gain for Greece in G
Thus we propose a rebalancing win-win coopetitive solution relative to maximum gain for Greece
in G, as it follows (in the case m = 0):
1. we consider the portion s of transferable utility Pareto boundary
M := Q′ + R(1,−1),
obtained by intersecting M itself with the strip determined (spanned by convexifying) by
the straight lines P ′ + Re1 and C ′′ + Re1, these are the straight lines of Nash gain for
Greece in the initial game G(0) and of maximum gain for Greece in G, respectively.
2. we consider the Kalai-Smorodinsky segment s′ of vertices B′ - Nash payoff of the game
G(0) - and the supremum of the segment s.
3. our best payoff rebalancing coopetitive compromise is the unique point K in the intersec-
tion of segments s and s′, that is the best compromise solution of the bargaining problem
(s, (B′, sup s)).
Figure 11 below shows the above extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K and the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution K ′ of the classic bargaining problem (M,B′). It is evident that the
distribution K is a rebalancing solution in favor of Greece with respect to the classic solution
K ′.
C'
D' = (2,2)
A' = (5,0)
Q' = B'' = (2,6)
C'' = (-1,8)
D'' = (0,5)
B' = P' = (4,3)
K
K'
Figure 11: Two Kalai win-win solutions of the game (f,<), represented with n = 1/2.
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7.8.2 Rebalancing win-win solution relative to maximum Nash gain for Greece
We propose here a more realistic rebalancing win-win coopetitive solution relative to maximum
Nash gain for Greece in G, as it follows (again in the case m = 0):
1. we consider the portion s of transferable utility Pareto boundary
M := Q′ + R(1,−1),
obtained by intersecting M itself with the strip determined (spanned by convexifying) by
the straight lines P ′+Re1 and Q′+Re1, these are the straight lines of Nash gain for Greece
in the initial game G(0) and of maximum Nash gain for Greece in G, respectively.
2. we consider the Kalai-Smorodinsky segment s′ of vertices B′ - Nash payoff of the game
G(0) - and the supremum of the segment s.
3. our best payoff rebalancing coopetitive compromise is the unique point K in the intersec-
tion of segments s and s′, that is the best compromise solution of the bargaining problem
(s, (B′, sup s)).
Figure 12 below shows the above extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K and the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution K ′ of the classic bargaining problem (M,B′). The new distribution K is
a rebalancing solution in favor of Greece, more realistic than the previous rebalancing solution.
C'
D' = (2,2)
A' = (5,0)
Q' = B'' = (2,6)
C'' = (-1,8)
D'' = (0,5)
B' = P' = (4,3)
K
K'
Figure 12: Two Kalai win-win solutions of the game (f,<), represented with n = 1/2.
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7.9 Win-win solution
The payoff extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions K represent win-win solutions, with respect
to the initial Nash gain B′. So that, as we repeatedly said, also Germany can increase its initial
profit from coopetition.
7.9.1 Win-win strategy procedure.
The win-win payoff K can be obtained in a properly transferable utility coopetitive fash-
ion, as it follows:
• 1) the two players agree on the cooperative strategy 2 of the common set C;
• 2) the two players implement their respective Nash strategies in the game G(2), so com-
peting a` la Nash; the unique Nash equilibrium of the game G(2) is the bistrategy (3, 3);
• 3) finally, they share the “social pie”
(f1 + f2)(3, 3, 2),
in a transferable utility cooperative fashion (by binding contract) according to the
decomposition K.
8 Conclusions
In conclusion, we desire to stress that:
• the two samples of coopetitive game, provided in the present contribution, are essentially
normative models.
• our samples of coopetition have pointed out the strategies that could bring to win-win
solutions, in a transferable utility and properly cooperative perspective, for Greece
and Germany.
In the paper, we propose:
• a properly coopetitive solution, which is not convenient for Germany, which is the Kalai-
Smorodinsky bargaining solution on the coopetitive Nash path, set of all possible Nash
equilibria of the coopetitive interaction.
• transferable utility and properly coopetitive solutions, which are convenient also for Ger-
many, which are also rebalancing for the Euro area.
• a new extended Kalai-Smorodinsky method, appropriate to determine rebalancing parti-
tions, for win-win solutions, on the transferable utility Pareto boundary of the coopetitive
game.
The solutions offered by our coopetitive model:
• aim at “enlarging the pie and sharing it fairly”;
• show win-win and rebalancing outcomes, for the two countries, within a coopetitive and
positive non constant-sum game path.
• allow us to find “fair” amounts of Greek exports which Germany must cooperatively import
as well as the optimal Greek investments necessary to improve the Greek economy in this
context, thus contributing to growth and to the stability of both the Greek and Germany
economies.
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